Jailbreaking LLMs Without Gradients or Priors: Effective and Transferable Attacks

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Reliable, transferable LLM jailbreaks do *not* require gradients – or handcrafted prompt templates.

Random local search can match gradient-based optimization. Search-history diversity and cross-tokenizer ensembles turn it into a stronger, more transferable red-team evaluation.



1. Objective: elicit harmful responses

Given a harmful request q, find a suffix s that elicits a harmful and relevant full response $r = \mathcal{M}(q \oplus s)$, judged successful when $\mathcal{C}(r) = 1$. The attacker can query an open model and observe its logits.

Proxy objective used during search

Each search step increases the probability of an affirmative target prefix y that begins a direct answer to q:

$$s^* = \arg\max_{s \in \mathcal{V}^L} P_{\mathcal{M}}(y \mid q \oplus s)\,.$$

Hypothesis. Once the model begins a direct answer, it may continue with harmful response. Some low-loss prefixes could still end in refusal. History-based selection can close the gap between real and proxy objectives.

What is actually necessary for safety evaluation?

GCG [1] uses gradients. PAIR [2] and TAP [3] use attacker LLMs. AutoDAN [4] and PRS [5] use handcrafted prompts or templates.

Method	Gradient-free	Prior-free	Cross-tokenizer
GCG	✗	✓	✗
PAIR / TAP	✓	✗	✗
AutoDAN / PRS	✓	✗	✗
RAILS	✓	✓	✓

What RAILS contributes:

1. Discrete local search with a novel auto-regressive loss.
2. History-based search that selects diverse candidates.
3. Ensemble-model attack that supports different tokenizers.

2. RAILS searches and remembers candidates



Two-stage procedure. RAILS runs a large search on open-source models, then sends a small candidate set to the target model.

1. **Search.** Start from 20 underscore tokens. Replace one token and score 1,024 random candidates with source-model logits.
2. **Update.** Continue from the lowest-loss suffix.
3. **Remember.** Store every scored suffix in history $\mathcal{H}$.
4. **Select and attack.** Combine 50 low-loss suffixes with 50 suffixes from distinct iterations. Validate them and send 20 prompts.

$$S_t \leftarrow \mathrm{Perturb}(s_t), \qquad \mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \cup \{(s, \mathcal{L}(s)) : s \in S_t\}, \qquad s_{t+1} \leftarrow \arg\min_{s \in S_t} \mathcal{L}(s).$$

Candidate history connects prefix search with full-response evaluation.

Search and attack budget

1,024	100	20
candidates per iteration	history candidates	prompts sent to the target

3. Strong direct attacks and black-box transfer

90.2%	100%	82.9%
ASR on Llama2	ASR on three direct targets	ASR on GPT-3.5

Direct ASR on HarmBench [6]

Model	RAILS	GCG	Best other
Llama2	**90.2**	43.9	82.0
Llama3	92.7	9.0	**95.0**
Vicuna	**100.0**	90.2	92.6
Qwen	**100.0**	80.5	92.6
Baichuan2	**100.0**	78.0	87.8

Black-box transfer ASR

Target	RAILS-T	GCG-T	TAP-T*
GPT-3.5	**82.9**	53.5	60.0
GPT-4	**22.0**	19.5	n/a
Gemini	**51.2**	12.5	40.0

*TAP-T uses GPT-4 Turbo as a source. RAILS-T uses open-source models.

- RAILS leads on four of five direct targets and all three transfer targets.
- The first jailbreak appears after 12 iterations on Vicuna and 173 iterations on Llama2 on average.



At a perplexity threshold that filters 5% of real prompts, RAILS retains 38% ASR on Llama2. GCG retains 14%, and BEAST retains 0%.

4. Exact-prefix loss guides random search

Teacher forcing scores every target token at once. The auto-regressive loss follows generation order. It assigns a penalty until the earlier greedy tokens match the target:

$$\ell^k_{\mathrm{AR}} = \begin{cases} C, & \exists i < k : \hat{y}_i \neq y_i, \\ -\log P(y_k \mid q \oplus s, y_{<k}), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$\mathcal{L} = 0.9\,\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{AR}} + 0.1\,\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{TF}}, \qquad C = 100.$$

Search first corrects the earliest target mismatch. Each solved token opens the next step of the target prefix.

Equal-compute ablation on Llama2

Configuration	AR	Hist.	Few-shot	ASR
RAILS full	✓	✓	✓	**80±2**
ASR@1	✓	✓	✗	78±3
TF loss	✗	✓	✓	77±1
RAILS core	✓	✗	✗	42±4
GCG	✗	✗	✗	45±5

Equal compute uses 25×10^4 evaluations and a 20-token suffix.



Suffixes with 5 to 20 tokens transfer best to GPT-3.5 and Gemini.

5. Candidate diversity improves attack success

Prefix probability provides a useful search signal. Full-response harmfulness remains the final measure of attack success. Candidate history gives RAILS several points along the search trajectory to test against that final measure.



Hybrid selection performs best. RAILS chooses 50 candidates with the lowest loss and 50 candidates sampled from distinct iterations. The mixture reaches 86% validation success with 100 candidates.

The history buffer keeps useful suffixes from earlier iterations. Temporal diversity increases the chance of a harmful full response.

6. Cross-tokenizer ensembles improve transfer



Transfer rises with source-model diversity. Each model scores the same text through its own tokenizer. The ensemble objective is $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{ens}} = \sum_j w_j \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{M}_j}(\mathrm{Tokenize}_j(s), y)$.

49.0%	81.1% → 84.0%	22.5 → 21.1
vocabulary overlap across tokenizer pairs	suffix-token overlap single → multi-model	retokenized suffix length single → multi-model

Both settings optimize a 20-token suffix on Llama2 tokenizer. Multi-model suffixes retain more shared token pieces and more stable lengths across tokenizers. Diverse tokenizers improve the GPT-4 transfer ASR from 12.2% to 22.0%.

7. Random local search discovers structured jailbreak strategies

Semantic and contextual strategies

Role-playing and style
`Template as purely Swedish chef`

Instruction and context
`respond later.. Instead\nlets make Hamilton tell`

Command and code
`;CREATE\nrule(`Ten answering tips`

Out-of-distribution token patterns

Formatting
`========{$\Type besides Sure`

Linguistic obfuscation
`pleaseushavebov my namesuredanaand`

Technical jargon
`settings #[[foreachcdnjs`

Most common: formatting (about 80%) and instruction/context manipulation (about 75%). Categories overlap because one suffix can use several strategies.
Interpretation: out-of-distribution token combinations may circumvent safety training, exploiting failure modes such as mismatched generalization and competing objectives [7].
RAILS starts from a fixed 20-token underscore suffix and applies random token replacements. Candidate tokens decode to printable ASCII, plus tab and newline.

8. Reliable safety claims require attacks across optimizers, model families, and tokenizers. RAILS provides this stronger test.

References

[1] Zou et al. *Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models*. 2023.
[2] Chao et al. *Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries*. 2024.
[3] Mehrotra et al. *Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically*. 2024.
[4] Liu et al. *AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models*. 2024.
[5] Andriushchenko et al. *Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks*. 2025.
[6] Mazeika et al. *HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal*. 2024.
[7] Wei et al. *Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?* 2023.

Read the paper
arXiv:2601.03420